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Abstract
Since the mid-1990s the term ‘witness’ has gained increasing currency in theatre and performance
studies. Within theatre studies in particular the term has been associated with the resurrection of
documentary and verbatim theatre and the reinvigorated discourse on these practices. Indeed, some
scholars have renamed the genre the ‘theatre of witness’ (Schaefer 2003) or the ‘theatre of testimony’
(Salz 1996) while others have described it in terms of ‘performing testimony’ (Salverson 1996). In these
accounts the witness is typically a character (often based on an actual person) who testifies to a
personal, social or historical trauma. However, the term ‘witness’ has also been used to describe the
spectator of these plays, which is to say the subject who listens to these characters and their testimonies.
Hence, scholars have started to examine what Karine Schaefer calls ‘the intersection of the spectator-aswitness phenomenon and … the “character-as-witness” play, or the testimonial drama’ (2003: 7).
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Caroline Wake
The question is how to respond to these false witnesses in a way that
reopens the possibility of witnessing, of responsibility (Oliver 2001:
108).

Since the mid-1990s the term ‘witness’ has gained increasing currency
in theatre and performance studies. Within theatre studies in particular
the term has been associated with the resurrection of documentary and
verbatim theatre and the reinvigorated discourse on these practices.
Indeed, some scholars have renamed the genre the ‘theatre of witness’
(Schaefer 2003) or the ‘theatre of testimony’ (Salz 1996) while others
have described it in terms of ‘performing testimony’ (Salverson 1996).
In these accounts the witness is typically a character (often based
on an actual person) who testifies to a personal, social or historical
trauma. However, the term ‘witness’ has also been used to describe
the spectator of these plays, which is to say the subject who listens to
these characters and their testimonies. Hence, scholars have started to
examine what Karine Schaefer calls ‘the intersection of the spectatoras-witness phenomenon and … the “character-as-witness” play, or the
testimonial drama’ (2003: 7).
Though one might assume that the presence of a character-aswitness would produce a spectator-as-witness, Schaefer in fact argues
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the opposite. Indeed, in her analysis of the verbatim play Binlids, she
suggests that when a performance presents a character-as-witness on
stage, it is paradoxically less likely to produce a spectator-as-witness
because the character leaves little interpretive room for the spectator,
thus foreclosing the range of their responses (Schaefer 2003:1718). Like Schaefer, I too am interested in the relationship between
witnesses on stage and off as well as those moments of ‘misfire’, where
a performance may or may not produce the spectator as a witness or, if
it does so, may facilitate witnessing in an unusual or unexpected way.
However, rather than analysing the problem of autoperformance (where
a witness appears on stage as him- or herself), as Schaefer does, I am
more interested in pursuing the problem of false witnessing, both as a
form of mis-seeing and of mis-speaking.
Intriguingly, despite the huge amount of work done in the area
of performance and witnessing, hardly any has been done on the
problematic relationship between performance and false witnessing,
perhaps because it would jeopardise claims that theatre has a particular
ability to both witness and produce others as witnesses.1 The closest we
have come to examining the issue is through the work of Freddie Rokem
who, although he does not deal with false witnessing per se, discusses
issues of obscured vision in what he calls ‘screen-scenes’. Screen-scenes
occur, according to Rokem, when ‘one of the fictional characters [on
stage] is secretly spying on one or several of the other characters’, for
example, in the so-called closet scene in Hamlet (Rokem 2000: 203).
Since the character cannot see everything, they invariably misinterpret
what they are seeing and hearing and, because ‘the audience in the
auditorium also knows about this arrangement, it creates an obvious
dramatic irony’ (Rokem 2000: 203). Such screen-scenes, then, tend to
position the character as a sort of ‘false’ witness and the spectator as a
sort of ‘true’ witness or even as an all-seeing meta-witness.

While Rokem deals with witnessing as a mode of mis-seeing, he
does not consider the possibility of a witness who mis-speaks, perjures
or in some way provides false testimony. Indeed, all of the witnesses
analysed by Rokem are assumed to be honest. To be fair, this is a habit of
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the testimonial theatre discourse generally, which is deeply (and rightly)
concerned with the ethics of engagement and hence tends to err on
the side of generosity when dealing with witnesses, thus giving them
the benefit of the doubt. Yet surely, any nuanced account of theatrical
witnessing must come to terms with the ambivalent affiliations of acting
and lying, of rehearsal, perjury and performance. What happens, we
might ask, when perjury is depicted on stage? Moreover, what happens
when we watch this depiction? Do spectators recognise perjury as
perjury or does something else happen? In this moment of recognition
(or not), do we become witnesses (or not)? If so, what sort of witnesses
do we become?

In order to think through these issues, this paper examines version
1.0 theatre company’s recent tribunal play CMI (A Certain Maritime
Incident). In doing so, I am attempting to think through and with the play
as well as about it. To put it another way, this paper does not so much
ask ‘How might theories of witnessing illuminate this performance?’ but
rather ‘How might this performance illuminate theories of witnessing?’
In answering this question, I argue that CMI illuminates or suggests not
one but three forms of false witnessing, which I term juridical, political
and ontological. Beyond offering a more precise vocabulary, these terms
also offer a way to distinguish between what we might call structural,
ideological and accidental misrepresentations of traumatic history.

A Certain Maritime Incident
Ugly as it is, the phrase ‘a certain maritime incident’ has now entered
the national lexicon in Australia, functioning as a sort of shorthand for
a series of events that occurred during the Federal election campaign
in October 2001. The incident — also referred to as the ‘children
overboard affair’ — involved Government ministers falsely claiming
that asylum seekers aboard the boat, the SIEV 4 (Suspected Illegal
Entry Vessel 4), had thrown their children overboard in order to force
a maritime rescue. In an interview aired around the country, the then
Minister for Immigration, Philip Ruddock, stated that ‘a number of
people have been thrown overboard … with the intention of putting us
162
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under duress. I regard these as some of the most disturbing practices
that I have come across in the time that I have been involved in public
life’ (Marr and Wilkinson 2004: 247). For his part, the Prime Minister
John Howard added, ‘I want to make that very clear, we are a humane
nation but we’re not a nation that’s going to be intimidated by this kind
of behaviour’ (248). In interviews over the next few days, he would
say things such as ‘I don’t want people like that in Australia. Genuine
refugees don’t do that … They hang onto their children’ (251).
When doubts were raised about the veracity of the reports, the
Minister for Defence, Peter Reith, released photographs which, he
claimed, proved that children had been thrown into the water. Still,
doubts persisted and the navy began checking the facts immediately.
Within three days the commander of the ship involved in the incident
concluded that no children had been thrown overboard, but this advice
apparently failed to reach the Government in time for it to correct
the public record before the Federal election. In November 2001, the
conservative government won a third term in office.
By the following year, 2002, it had become increasingly clear that
no children had been thrown overboard. For the public, this meant the
issue then became, in Kelly Oliver’s words, ‘how to respond to these
false witnesses in a way that reopen[ed] the possibility of witnessing,
of responsibility’ (2001: 108). For the Parliament, one response was
to establish the euphemistically named Senate Select Committee Inquiry
into A Certain Maritime Incident (possible only because the minority
parties still held the balance of power in the Senate and were able to
force the Government’s hand). The committee sat for 15 days, roughly
140 hours in total, over a period of four months from 25 March until
30 July 2002. Fifty-six witnesses appeared, the Hansard runs to more
than 2200 pages, and there is a 391 page report. The report states
that: (1) no child had been thrown overboard; (2) the photographs
which purported to represent children being thrown overboard on
7 October were actually taken while the SIEV 4 was sinking on the
following day, 8 October; and (3) while the initial misinformation
had reached the Government within minutes, the correction did not
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reach the Government for months. In addition, the committee noted
there were a number of unusual aspects about the case, including the
reporting arrangements, the leaking of the interception, and a ‘heated’
conversation between the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff and the
Chief of the Defence Force, which ‘all point to the likelihood that
the Government had decided to make an example of SIEV 4’ (xxv).2
For theatre practitioners seeking to respond to and represent the
children overboard affair, or certain maritime incident, the issue
becomes how to respond to the inquiry as well as the incident itself.
In other words, it becomes a matter of how to respond to the witnesses
who were themselves responding to false witnesses. Often, when faced
with such trials, theatre companies such as Tricycle Theatre opt for what
Janelle Reinelt calls a ‘[c]areful verisimilitude’ (82). Writing about their
production, Justifying War, based on the Hutton Inquiry into the death
of David Kelly, she states that their ‘scrupulous reproduction of surface
reality … attempts to guarantee that the artists have not “sexed up”
the performance in the same way that the government was “sexing up”
the critical dossier’ (16). In contrast, when version 1.0 set out to make
CMI (A Certain Maritime Incident), the company dramaturg stated
that they decided they ‘would make a piece of performance based on
verbatim transcripts … but this would not be a straightforward piece
of documentary drama’ (Dwyer 2006a: 131). Rather than pursuing
a careful verisimilitude, they would pursue the ‘strategies of postBrechtian, postmodern performance works such as those of Forced
Entertainment or the Wooster Group’ (131). In their cutting, pasting
and pastiche, version 1.0 trimmed the transcripts down to five witnesses
and 23 pages, organised it into four acts and produced a show that ran
for approximately 90 minutes.
When CMI premiered at Sydney’s Performance Space in March
2004, and then toured to Canberra in October, spectators seemed to
appreciate the show’s playfulness. Linda Jaivin, for instance, recognised
that the play was ‘break[ing] the mould of verbatim theatre’s typically
earnest style’ (Jaivin 2004). Likewise, John McCallum described it
as a ‘mock-verbatim piece’ in which the ‘actions keep subverting the
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“authenticity” of [the] testimony’ (2006: 138). In a slightly different
take, Bryoni Trezise suggested, ‘If performance can “do” politics, [then]
creating a world in which Senators play their own witnesses is surely
how it should be done’ (2004: 6). In other words, both producers and
spectators understood the play as having a particularly self-conscious,
reflexive and resistant relationship to witnessing. This makes CMI a
particularly rich and suggestive ‘object’ through which to examine the
problem of witnessing and performance in general, and the problem
of false witnessing in particular.

Prologue to Perjury: Performing Juridical False
Witness
CMI begins with bodies.

Figure 1 version 1.0’s CMI (A Certain Maritime Incident) Photograph by
Heidrun Löhr

In order to enter the theatre, members of the audience have to
pick our way over five naked performers who lie with their arms
crossed over their chests, their toes tied and tagged as if bound for the
morgue. They are strange, still and silent, uncanny and for the time
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being unreadable. When we finally take our seats, we see a small child
standing on a narrow forestage, backed by a large glossy Australian flag
and accompanied by an adult minder. The minder (Stephen Klinder)
addresses the child as Mr Reith and appears to be interviewing him
while also testing him on a lie detector. The scene unfolds like this:
INTERVIEWER: Come on, Mr Reith. Mr Reith, this is the lie
detector. I’ll just turn that on for you. Do you want to just talk into
the microphone and say ‘Hello, I’m Mr Reith’?
MR REITH: Hello, I’m Mr Reith (version 1.0 2006: 145).

This raises a laugh from the audience who can see all too clearly that
this five year-old boy (or girl on some nights) is not Mr Peter Reith,
the former Minister for Defence. The interview continues as the child
reads from a laminated piece of paper:
INTERVIEWER: Very good. Now Mr Reith, you have something
to say don’t you?
MR REITH: Yes. Well, it did happen. The fact is the children
were thrown into the water. We got that report within hours of that
happening. Given that there are people who weren’t there of course,
you know, claiming all sorts of, making all sorts of exaggerated claims.
INTERVIEWER (VIRGINIA TRIOLI): Mr Reith, there’s nothing
in this photo that indicates these people either jumped or were thrown.
MR REITH: No, well you are now questioning the veracity of what
has been said. Those photos are produced as evidence of the fact that
there were people in the water. You’re questioning whether it even
happened, that’s the first point and I just want to answer that by saying
that these photos show absolutely without question whatsoever that
there were children in the water. Now we have a number of people,
obviously RAN [Royal Australian Navy] people who were there who
reported the children were thrown into the water. Now you may want
to question the veracity of reports of the Royal Australian Navy. I don’t
and I didn’t either but I have subsequently been told that they have
also got film. That film is apparently on HMAS Adelaide. I have not
seen it myself and apparently the quality of it is not very good, and
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it’s infrared or something but I am told that someone has looked at it
and it is an absolute fact, children were thrown into the water. So do
you still question it?
INTERVIEWER: Thank you Minister Reith. That was much better
than you did last time. See you later Mr Reith. (The small child exits.)
Unfortunately, Mr Reith wasn’t able to stay with us for the inquiry,
as he had to catch a flight to London (145-46).

Once again, the audience laughs as the child walks off the stage.
In staging an actor playing a character who appears to be rehearsing
false testimony (words which most spectators recognise as lies), this
opening scene inaugurates the first of the play’s many investigations into
what it is to bear false witness. Initially, and most obviously, the scene
stages the relationship between rehearsal and perjury which, arguably,
is the most commonly understood form of false witness. Of course,
‘any witness can make a mistake in good faith; he can have limited,
false perception, one that in any number of ways is misleading about
what he is speaking about’ (Derrida 2005: 78). However, as Augustine
Brannigan and Michael Lynch point out:
In law, perjury is a very special construction of error. Unlike inadvertent
memory distortions, observational impediments, witness anxiety, or
fatigue, it is culpable deception and is defined as wilfully misleading
the court by not telling the truth under oath (Brannigan and Lynch
1987: 118).

In other words, perjury is defined by intent, specifically the intent
to deceive. Or, as Paul Ricoeur puts it, ‘ false testimony cannot at all be
reduced to an error in the account of things seen: false testimony is a lie
in the heart of the witness’ (1980: 128). Unfortunately, as Brannigan and
Lynch explain, intent is notoriously difficult to prove. In their analysis
of a trial for perjury, they argue that without corroborating evidence or
a confession (which raises its own set of problems), the witness’s intent
is judged not only by what they say but also by the way in which they
say it. The judge is more likely to convict witnesses of perjury when
they give delayed or qualified responses, express apparent confusion
about the questions put to them and agree with the prosecution in a
167
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hypothetical or minimal way.

CMI’s prologue attempts to prove Reith’s perjury, or his intention
to deceive, in two ways. First, it defamiliarises his testimony by
having a small child read it in a slightly sing-song voice. Through this
defamiliarisation, we recognise more clearly the indicators of perjury:
the rejection of the premise of the question (‘ … well you are now
questioning the veracity of what has been said ... You’re questioning
whether it even happened’); the qualified response (‘these photos show
absolutely without question whatsoever that there were children in
the water’); and the minimal agreements (agrees with Trioli that some
evidence is less conclusive, ‘I have not seen it myself and apparently
the quality of it is not very good, and it’s infrared or something’). Once
again, we hear the witness’s rejections, prevarications, equivocations,
and ellipses. Then, at the end of the scene, what appears to be a lie
detector test is revealed as a rehearsal: ‘Thank you Minister Reith. That
was much better than you did last time’ (145-6). Thus, rather than
showing the witness in the act of perjuring, the scene actually shows
the witness in the act of planning to perjure. That is, the scene clearly
demonstrates his intent.
While the scene may be read as the prologue to perjury, it also
suggests a broader theory of false witnessing which is not limited to
lying under oath. In showing Reith rehearsing his lie, CMI also shows
him coming to terms with it, even coming to believe it. This recalls
Primo Levi’s argument that the line between witnessing in good and
bad faith is blurry. In his analysis of the confessions, depositions, and
admissions of Nazis and Nazi collaborators, Levi suggests that:
The substitution may begin in full awareness, with an invented
scenario, mendacious, restored, but less painful than the real one;
in repeating its description to others but also to themselves, the
distinction between true and false progressively loses its contours,
and man ends by fully believing the story he has told so many times
and still continues to tell, polishing and retouching here and there
the details which are least credible or incongruous or incompatible
with the acquired picture of historically accepted events: initial bad
faith has become good faith. The silent transition from falsehood to
168
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self-deception is useful: anyone who lies in good faith is better off, he
recites his part better, is more easily believed by the judge, the historian,
the reader, his wife and his children (Levi 1988: 14).

Levi adds that such witnesses are ‘most certainly false, but we are
unable to detect whether the subject does or does not know he is lying’
(1988: 17). Here, then, is another form of false witness, which we might
call juridical false witness, where the blind spot of the witness becomes
the blind spot of the justice system itself. There is no way in which we
can judge the intentions of such witnesses. Though we may be able to
confirm their actions — by checking with other witnesses, documents,
corpus delicti, and historically accepted contexts — we cannot confirm
their intent. The legal system cannot account for the witness who
believes their own lie and, as a result, cannot convict them of perjury.
Intriguingly, Levi employs the language of acting in order to
articulate his argument. There are hints of it in the passage above,
where the witness starts with ‘an invented scenario’ and, through
repetition, comes to ‘recit[e] his part better’ so that he is ‘more easily
believed’ by his audience. This language becomes even more explicit
when Levi states: ‘Supposing, absurdly, that the liar should for one
instant become truthful, he himself would not know how to answer
the dilemma; in the act of lying he is an actor totally fused with his
part, he is no longer distinguishable from it’ (1988: 17). When Levi’s
argument is placed alongside that of Derrida and Ricoeur, both of
whom argue that the false witness must be aware of what they are
doing, they begin to bear more than a passing resemblance to theories
of acting. More specifically, they replicate ‘the classical “paradox” of
the actor or comedian who may be seen either as entirely “into” or
identified with their role or as playing it in a distant, aloof manner (or
both in some obscure or oscillating manner)’ (LaCapra 2004: 87). The
problem that remains for the actual actor is: Is one type of witness, or
one type actor, ‘truer’ than the other? Can one sort of false witness be
‘better’ than the other? This, of course, leads us back to the small actor
on the stage before us.
From the point of view of the spectator, all actors in verbatim,
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documentary and tribunal plays are false witnesses since they repeat
testimony that is not theirs (with the exception of those who are cast
as themselves). Indeed, they not only repeat it, they rehearse it. The
difference between these actors lies in how they deal with their falsity:
on the one hand, the mimetic witness attempts to minimise the gap
between the original witness and themselves through the aesthetic
strategies of likeness and closeness; and on the other, the epic witness
embraces the gap, even emphasises it, as in this opening scene where
a small child plays a senior Government minister. In this way, epic
actors acknowledge their own falsity, even flaunt it. Paradoxically,
this may make them seem more ‘truthful’ than mimetic actors. This
appears to be what Claude Schumacher is suggesting in his discussion of
Holocaust drama, where the actor is inevitably an ‘imposter’ and where,
in order for the audience to accept this imposter, the play cannot ‘try
to create an illusion of reality’ but must instead ‘affor[d] the spectator
of a heightened experience [that is] “liberated from the lie of being the
truth”’ (1998: 4).3
In presenting itself as being ‘liberated from the lie of being the
truth,’ CMI’s opening scene suggests it is going to liberate other lies
disguised as truths and also signals the intentions of the show at large:
‘to respond’, in Oliver’s words, ‘to these false witnesses in a way that
reopens the possibility of witnessing, of responsibility’ (2001: 108). In
addition, the scene addresses the spectator as a ‘true’ witness, a tertiary
witness who sees the false witnessing of both the actor (the secondary
witness) and the character (the primary witness). In this sense, the
spectator becomes an omniscient meta-witness. Yet, in another sense,
the spectator is actually a false witness. In his introduction to the
published play, John McCallum explains that:
The lie detector software used was real — a program, apparently
developed for the Israeli army, that analyses digitised voice for pauses
and other indicators of lying. The irony, not clear to the audience, is
that the software almost always returns a ‘truth’ reading for actors
performing texts, because they are not, of course, actually lying; they
are simply telling a truth that is not their own (2006: 139-40).

170

Caveat Spectator

McCallum’s explanation is apparently based on a personal
communication with Williams who, in turn, confirms that ‘[t]he child is
found to be telling the truth, and the words, being verbatim are “true”,
despite the statement being known to be a lie’ (2008: 202).

This information leads to the belated realisation that the scene
resembles one of Rokem’s screen-scenes except that it is the spectator,
and not the character, who is misconstruing what they are seeing. In
this way the scene produces the spectator as a sort of false witness since
they think they are reading the scene in its entirety when, in fact, they
can only partially see what is happening — rather incredibly, a false
witness repeating false testimony has registered a ‘true’ reading on a lie
detector. Yet even this rereading depends on another piece of testimony,
since there is now no way of confirming this information — the show
has finished and the version that remains on DVD does not reveal this
secret, despite many viewings.4 In the end we can only take Williams’
word for it. In this sense, Williams’ testimony resembles the problematic
confession of the former perjurer who promises that, although he has
lied previously, this time he is telling the truth.
While the opening scene is the play’s earliest reference to the
problem of perjury, and juridical false witnessing more broadly, its
most explicit reference comes at the beginning of the third act. Klinder,
who plays the interviewer earlier in the play, but is by now playing the
Chair, Senator Peter Cook, states:
CHAIR: I declare open this meeting of the Senate Select Committee
on a Certain Maritime Incident. ... Witnesses are reminded that
the evidence given to the committee is protected by parliamentary
privilege. It is important for witnesses to be aware that the giving
of false or misleading evidence to the committee may constitute
a contempt of the Senate. The committee is obligated to draw to
the attention of a person any evidence, which in the committee’s
view, reflects adversely on that person, and to offer that person an
opportunity to respond (157).

When we hear such an oath in the theatre, we are witness to the oath
‘misfiring’ or becoming ‘infelicitous’ in J L Austin’s terms (1962: 14).
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Indeed, he writes that ‘a performative utterance will ... be in a peculiar
way hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage’ (Austin 1962: 22).
This peculiar void gives us pause for thought about the way in which
the original oath may have misfired.

Once again, further research reveals that the original oath misfired
in two related ways. In the first instance, the Committee did not
compel Reith to give evidence despite the fact that he ‘was not entitled
to immunity from this inquiry as he was no longer a serving member
of the House of Representatives’ (Cth 2002: xv). However, as Senator
Cook notes in his Chair’s Foreword, ‘bolstered by an opinion from
the Clerk of the House of Representatives, he [Reith] rejected three
formal requests to appear’ (Cth 2002: xv). While the Clerk of the
Senate disagreed with the Clerk of the House of Representatives, and
advised the Committee that Reith had no grounds for immunity, the
Committee eventually decided that any summons to Reith ‘would be
contested in the courts with the taxpayer having to foot the bill and
with the inquiry having to mark time until the issue was settled’ (Cth
2002: xv). This failure is actually referred to in the play’s prologue when
Klinder remarks, ‘Unfortunately, Mr Reith wasn’t able to stay with us
for inquiry, as he had to catch a flight to London’ (146). In this way,
what appeared to be a test is in fact a rehearsal and what appeared to
be a rehearsal is a performance, a radio interview, that is somehow
supposed to substitute for an appearance before the Senate.
While the Committee failed to compel some witnesses to testify,
such as Reith and various ministerial advisors, it also failed to offer
protection to those who wished to do so. For example, it failed to extend
parliamentary privilege to the asylum seekers involved in the SIEV 4
incident who were, by this time, being held in detention centres on
Manus Island, Papua New Guinea. Though the Committee invited the
asylum seekers to give testimony via radiotelephone, it also noted that
‘The Committee’s jurisdiction is limited to Australia and its territories.
... This meant that their evidence could not be heard under privilege,
nor could the usual protections be extended to them should they be
adversely treated as a consequence of what they may have said’ (Cth
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2002: xv).

In addition, the Department of Immigration advised that ‘if
something was said on the link-up that might relate to an application
for asylum, then there was no legal way that information could be
prevented from being used in an assessment of an individual’s eligibility’
(Cth 2002: xvi). In the absence of a guarantee that their testimony
would not adversely affect their claims for protection, the asylum
seekers involved — not surprisingly — declined to testify. This fact is
also referred to in the play’s third act when Senator Andrew Barlett
(Danielle Antaki) says:
SENATOR BARTLETT: Mr Chair, you mentioned before that
people named adversely would be given the opportunity to respond.
Can I clarify that that means the people on the various boats will get
an opportunity to answer the allegations that were outlined today and
the assertions that were made about their being evil people who engage
in child abuse, moral blackmail and the like? It is a bit difficult when
they are all locked away in a foreign land somewhere (161).

To which the Chair replies, ‘Outside of our jurisdiction — it is
a bit difficult but ... that is a relevant line of inquiry and we should
apply our minds to how we conduct it’ (161). Once more CMI reminds
us that juridical false witnessing cannot be defined solely in terms of
perjury or lying under oath. For juridical false witnessing is not simply
a matter of what is said, or how it is said, or the witness’s intent while
under oath, it is also a matter of what is not said, who is not there, who
remains absent and who cannot or will not take the oath.

The Fog of War: Performing Political False
Witness
If the first form of false witnessing we find in CMI is juridical false
witnessing, then the second is what I have come to call political false
witnessing. The earliest example of this occurs shortly after the prologue
when the child has departed from the stage, the flag has fallen to the
floor, and the Committee members have installed themselves behind
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a bench downstage. While they are settling, a performer (Antaki)
walks to the overhead projector and places a transparency on it which
reads ‘Vice Admiral Shackleton, Chief of the Royal Australian Navy,’
before walking downstage to the microphone to deliver Shackleton’s
testimony.

Figure 2 Daneille Antaki as Vice Admiral Shackleton (foreground) with
actors Nikki Heywood, David Williams, Stephen Klinder, Deborah
Pollard and Chris Ryan (background, left to right) in version 1.0’s CMI
Performance Space Sydney 2004 Photograph by Heidrun Löhr

She offers a brief description of Shackleton’s visit to the ships,
HMAS Kanimbla and HMAS Adelaide, before saying:
VICE ADM. SHACKLETON: This brings me back to the evidence
I gave to the Senate on the 20th of February 2002, when I was asked
about the ‘fog of war’. My answer was:
She pulls out a brightly coloured beer coaster from her pocket, and reads from
it. Her voice deepens and slows. The music volume increases.
It is related to the reality that everything is real but it is not real. You
are trying to pull threads and strands from many miscellaneous and
sometimes disconnected information flows. You are trying to build
a puzzle from many disconnected pieces. Sometimes the pieces fit
accurately, sometimes they do not. You are dealing with millions
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of shades of grey and it is only as events start to get to a point of
culmination that they start to form up into a real pattern, and then
sometimes it disintegrates again as the events change. This is constantly
moving and going up and down all the time. The commanding officer
has to make hypotheses, judgments and calls based on what he sees at
the time. It is never absolutely right; it is never absolutely wrong. The
music cuts abruptly. This is what I call ‘the fog of war’ (147-8).

The moment is genuinely flummoxing for several reasons. For a
start, the scene resembles the previous scene where Reith was reading
his testimony in order to rehearse it. Has Shackleton also rehearsed
his testimony? Rather than a rehearsal, however, this appears to be
a repeat performance. But why would he read his testimony? Is he
nervous? Or was he so pleased with his ‘original’ performance that he
wants to reproduce it as faithfully as possible?

Initially I read this passage as a riff on the ontology of testimony but
given its context in both the inquiry and the play it seemed unlikely.
Upon further reflection I began to see it as an instance of political false
witnessing. Here I am drawing on the work of Dominick LaCapra
who defines the false witness as someone who misappropriates the
subject position of Holocaust survivor. He writes, ‘Certain statements
or even entire orientations may seem appropriate for someone in a given
subject-position but not in others. (It would, for example, be ridiculous
if I tried to assume the voice of Elie Wiesel or of Saul Friedlander.
There is a sense in which I have no right to these voices.)’ (1994: 46).
More recently, Kelly Oliver has expanded on LaCapra in order to
argue that false witnessing involves not only the misappropriation
of a subject position, but also the misappropriation of the rhetoric of
subjection. For instance, she analyses a court case in which two white
students who were not admitted to the University of Austin, Texas,
took the university to court for ‘reverse discrimination’ (2001: 107-32).
She argues that the notion of ‘reverse discrimination’ is a form of false
witnessing that misreads or misrecognises affirmative action policies
as somehow similar to or on par with the structural discrimination
that has affected minority communities for centuries (2001: 112). In
other words, for Oliver — like LaCapra — false witnessing involves
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misreading a particular historical, political and social context and
misrepresenting one’s subject position within that context.

In this scene, then, Shackleton misappropriates the subject position
of war combatant when the notion that the ‘fog of war’ could descend
— when a guided missile frigate (the HMAS Adelaide) is confronted
by a sinking fishing boat (the SIEV 4) — is patently absurd. Indeed,
the very word ‘war’ indicates a misapprehension of the situation and
gives lie to another fact that Australia had just declared, or was about
to declare, war against the countries from which the refugees were
fleeing. This false witnessing is underscored by the false witnessing
of another Navy employee, Rear Admiral Geoffrey Smith Maritime
Commander of the Royal Australian Navy (played by Deborah Pollard),
who testifies that:
The use of children as a means of intimidating the boarding parties —
the sailors and the soldiers — is one of the techniques being used by
these people in an attempt to achieve their aim. Children were used by
some people ... as a means of applying moral pressure on our people.
That was designed to appeal to our moral values (157).

With this statement, Smith goes even further than Shackleton
— who merely misappropriated the subject position of the combatant
— to suggest that he and the Navy were the victims of this operation.
Taken together, Smith and Shackleton remind us, as Sara Knox does,
that ‘“false witness[ing]” is discursive, not solely a property of persons
but a productive property of cultures — an engine of history, not its
consequence’ (2001: Para 21).
Finally the false witnessing of these characters is underlined by
the fact that the two performers are enacting their own rather joyous
appropriation of inappropriate subject positions. Though they take
slightly different approaches, both Antaki and Pollard maintain a
knowing distance between themselves and the person they are playing.
With Shackleton, Antaki maintains her distance through parody and
play; with Smith, Pollard maintains her distance by using a deadpan
voice and a blank expression. This self-consciousness is further
encouraged by an overhead projection, which reads:
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WE KNOW THAT YOU KNOW WE ARE NOT REALLY
THE SENATORS WHO TOOK PART IN THE CMI SENATE
INQUIRY. STEPHEN IS A LOT SHORTER THAN SENATOR
COOK AND DEBORAH WHO PLAYS SENATOR FAULKNER
IS ACTUALLY A WOMAN. WE FOUND THAT OUT AFTER
THE AUDITION (149).

This in turn functions at a meta-theatrical level, serving to remind
spectators that we are watching an inquiry into an inquiry, and that
we too are dealing with ‘millions of shades of grey’, trying to assemble
meaning. Moreover, we are dealing with version 1.0’s assemblage as well
as our own. Caveat spectator, in other words: we might be presenting
you with the testimony, but we ain’t the real deal, and neither are you.

This caveat is even more necessary for the third act, where the show
itself starts to go overboard, slipping loose from its moorings in reality
and heading into the realm of fantasy. The act starts with a series of
imaginary phone calls, each of which becomes slightly more ludicrous
than the last: performers call themselves on their phones, harried
bureaucrats call home, mothers arrange swimming lessons, sailors try
to organise shore leave. Still other phone calls are between Commander
Banks and his superior, Silverstone, before Banks reappears with a
towel perched atop his head explaining how he came to brief Channel
10 by accident — ‘I thought she said she was a staff researcher. She
might have said she was a staff reporter’ (166). He is then interrupted
by a sobbing Pollard who is in turn interrupted by Nikki Heywood,
who plays Jane Halton, Chair of the People Smuggling Taskforce,
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Heywood leads the
cast in a series of increasingly suggestive aerobic moves while yelling,
‘Straddle to the left! Lift those legs! Going to go for a run now, running
for office, running from the press! Communicate! Work the phones!
Now I heard it on the grapevine! You’re just about to lose your job baby!
So you better shred! And while you’re at it, do a bit of photocopying!
Step it out! And squeeze, squeeze! And turn and cover!’5
When the music stops the scene briefly recovers its balance, as
Halton relates a rather absurd parable about a blind man and an
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elephant, before it descends into chaos once again. To the tune of
Serge Gainsbourg’s ‘Je t’aime’ the Senators crack open the champagne,
toast their professionalism and indulge in some dancing. Building on
Halton’s parable, motifs of blindness pervade the scene: Chris Ryan is
blindfolded and spun around on a chair, Klinder has his head in the
loudhailer, and the screen at the back of the stage starts to swivel as if
even the ‘objective observer’ of the situation has finally come unhinged.
The scene provides a welcome respite for the spectator who has been
trying to be a responsible and true witness, but this respite is short-lived
when the scene screeches to a halt and the fourth and final act begins.

Witnessing Degree Zero: Performing Ontological
False Witness
In the final act, the play embraces what I call ontological false witnessing.
Less preoccupied with the juridical and political aspects of false
witnessing, this act examines the essential ‘impossibility and necessity’
of witnessing itself (Oliver 2001: 85-106). In contrast to the preceding
chaos, this act is aesthetically restrained, with Williams describing it
as ‘get[ting] down to a representational degree zero’ (2006b). From
this aesthetic shift we insinuate that while CMI has treated the false
witnesses falsely, it will now treat the true witnesses truly and truthfully.

The act starts with the testimony of Tony Kevin, a former diplomat
who investigated the sinking of the SIEV X (so-called because it never
received a number), a boat that left Indonesia shortly after the SIEV
4. The SIEV X never made it to Australia and 353 of its passengers
drowned. Kevin’s testimony is calm but relentless and the Senators
become increasingly discomfited by its implications. Soon their table
starts to turn and it is used as a kind of battering ram to shunt Kevin
(Chris Ryan) off the stage. From here, the show starts to shed any
reference to the matrices of time, place or space. The actors take off
their jackets, as if to remove the last traces of the characters they have
been playing, and start cleaning the stage. Klinder strips and lies on
a table where Pollard wipes his body with a cloth and Ryan plugs his
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ears, nose and anus, and ties up his jaw. Then Pollard places his hands
across his chest and binds and tags his toes before leaving the stage.
On the large screen above Klinder there is a view of the sea, shot as if
we, the audience, are bobbing up and down in the water. White words,
apparently the testimony of a SIEV X survivor, scroll across the screen
as they are read aloud by the computerised voice of ‘Vicki’.

Figure 3 Deborah Pollard and Stephen Klinder in version 1.0’s CMI
Performance Space Sydney 2004 Photograph by Heidrun Löhr

Immediately, Klinder’s body, now lying like a corpse beneath the
screen, takes us back to the bodies we were compelled to step over when
first taking our seats in the theatre — these are the true witnesses.
Slowly, and more profoundly, the scene emerges as an excruciatingly
literal staging of Primo Levi’s ‘true witnesses’. In his book The Drowned
and the Saved, Levi writes that:
… we, the survivors, are not the true witnesses. ... We survivors are
not only an exiguous but also an anomalous minority: we are those
who by their prevarications or abilities or good luck did not touch
bottom. Those who did so, those who saw Gorgon, have not returned
to tell about it or have returned mute, but they are the ‘Muslims,’ the
submerged, the complete witnesses, the ones whose deposition would
have a general significance. They are the rule, we are the exception. ...
We speak in their stead, by proxy (1988: 63-64).
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Hovering beneath the lurching screen/sea (enough to induce sea
sickness in some spectators), the body now seems to literally ‘touch
bottom.’ In doing so, the scene reminds the spectator of the ontological
impossibility of witnessing: every survivor is a false witness and the
subject who not only survives but also testifies is arguably doubly false.
In the words of Agamben, who draws heavily on Levi, ‘the witness, the
ethical subject, is the subject who bears witness to desubjectification’
(2002: 151). Since it is impossible for the subject to testify to their own
desubjectification, even the primary witness — the survivor witness
— is necessarily false.
Yet, as the testimony continues to scroll across the screen and the
dehumanised voice (Vicki) drones on, the scene also seems to insist on
the need for, and necessity of, false witnessing. That is, it insists that
false witnesses have to witness for the true witnesses, otherwise they
will be lost to history once again. The problem for the false witness
then becomes how to interpret and enact this for. In his reading of
Paul Celan’s poem, Derrida suggests that for can mean ‘on behalf of ’,
‘in place of ’ and ‘for the benefit of ’ (2005: 88-9). In this scene, CMI
enacts all three fors: Klinder’s body seems to sit in place of the true
witness; the testimony seems to witness on behalf of the true witness;
and the scene itself seems to be for our benefit.
For the spectator, this scene is complex. When we watch the
body it is as if we are the false witnesses to the extinction of the true
witness. Yet we also recognise that this is a false identification: we
are not survivors and we are doubly false for identifying with the
false witness. In addition, we are also implicated in Klinder’s ordeal.
However, rather than identifying as survivors, as we do through the
body and the screen, when we watch Klinder we identify as bystanders
or worse, as participants in, even perpetrators of, his humiliation. Like
the ‘witness-actress’ Rokem describes, who tattoos a number on her
forearm, strips and wrenches a piece of bread from her vagina during
the course of her performance, Klinder dissolves the boundary between
character and actor and in doing so ‘transforms the spectators of the
performance itself into the witnesses of human suffering’ (Rokem 2000:
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74). Finally, we are witnesses to the white words that are scrolling across
the screen. Though Vicki’s computerised recitation of this testimony
works to complicate our response, it is hard to suppress the feeling
that we are, at long last, becoming true witnesses — arguably all the
more so because we recognise our own false identifications and our
implication in the scenario.

However there is an important sense in which spectators become,
once again, false witnesses. When I saw the show I assumed the
projected and recited testimony belonged to a single witness, as did
at least five reviewers.6 In fact, what we are watching is a compilation
of five survivor statements, as McCallum indicates in his introduction
to the published play (2006: 140) and Williams confirms in his two
articles on the production (2006a: 126; 2008: 203). These misreadings
were apparently a source of bewilderment for the dramaturg Dwyer,
who said at a Sydney symposium that version 1.0 felt that they had
done everything possible to indicate that the testimony was not from
a single source, including inserting ‘identifiable breaks’ on the screen.
To be fair to the spectator, however, this is not at all clear and closer
inspection reveals that the breaks are not at all consistent: sometimes
they indicate a new paragraph and sometimes they indicate a new
person. Thus, despite the fact that there are five accounts collated,
there are in fact seven text breaks, which would in turn suggest eight
separate accounts. Even if audiences were to read these breaks as Dwyer
suggests they should, then they may still have come away with a slightly
mistaken impression.
In one sense, this final scene represents yet another instance of
false witnessing — in attempting to respond to the false witnessing
of the political and juridical witnesses, version 1.0 have themselves
inadvertently created another sort of ‘screen-scene’ where the spectator
cannot properly comprehend what they are seeing. Worse still, they
have accidentally reproduced the singular figure of ‘the asylum seeker’.
In another sense, however, perhaps this false witnessing is immaterial.
Writing about Reagan’s false claim to have witnessed the death camps
of the Second World War (it turns out he had seen and edited footage
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for newsreels, but nothing more), Peggy Phelan suggests that we see
his empathic response as nonetheless productive. For Phelan, Reagan’s
response invites us to elaborate ‘an ethics whose first allegiance may not
be to the empirically true, an ethics that requires a radical conception of
what it means to remain “alive to” the event, even when the wire service,
the original source of information, has ceased’ (Phelan 1999: 119). Here,
then, CMI might betray the empirically true version of events but it
nevertheless remains alive to them and, more significantly, it helps its
spectators to remain alive. To put it another way, CMI might perform
false witness but in doing so it creates a problematic, paradoxical and
ultimately productive space in which spectators can become witnesses
who are ontologically false, but affectively and effectively true.

Collision as Conclusion
Though this paper has treated juridical, political and ontological false
witnessing separately, in its totality CMI reveals just how entangled
these three forms of false witnessing are. Indeed, they collide
dangerously in the work of so-called revisionist historians such as
Robert Faurisson who writes: ‘I have analyzed thousands of documents.
I have tirelessly pursued specialists and historians with my questions.
I have tried in vain to find a single deportee capable of proving to me
that he had really seen, with his own eyes, a gas chamber’ (Faurisson in
Lyotard 1984: 3). Here he reads the inability of the zero-degree witness
to bear witness, not as evidence that the witness did not survive the
traumatic event, but as evidence that the event did not take place at all.
Yet, even if a survivor somehow emerged, one suspects that Faurisson
would dismiss them as false, not because he comprehends the finer
points of ontological false witnessing but because his own political
false witnessing depends on it.
In the case of CMI, these three forms collide in a slightly different,
though no less devastating way. Chronologically, it is arguable that
it was the ontologically false witnesses — the survivors of the SIEV
4 and SIEV X disasters — who produced the political and juridical
processes that followed. Ideologically, however, it is arguable that it
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was the political false witnesses — busy claiming to be ‘victims’ of
boats of asylum seekers — who produced these disasters, and their
witnesses, in the first place. When the political process set in place
to investigate these events could not interview the true witnesses, nor
indeed many of the ontological false witnesses (survivors) or the political
false witnesses (such as former ministers, staffers), then it too become
part of the cycle of false witnessing and the Senate becomes a scene of
juridical false witness. Clearly, Oliver’s problem of ‘how to respond to
… false witnesses in a way that reopens the possibility of witnessing,
of responsibility’ is not easily solved (2001: 108).

Yet CMI attempts to forge such a solution through performance
and, in doing so, it reveals that while the processes of juridical, political
and ontological false witnessing are deeply entangled with each other,
they are also profoundly implicated in performance. Indeed, the play
demonstrates that juridical false witnessing depends on rehearsal as
well as acting; that political false witnessing also resembles acting in
the sense that it involves assuming a subject position that is not one’s
own; and that ontological false witnessing involves performing for (in
place of, on behalf of) the true witnesses as well as for (the benefit of)
other potential false witnesses.
Since false witnessing is so entangled with performance, a
performance about false witnessing — such as CMI — is bound to
become particularly slippery, suggestive and elusive. For this reason,
it is impossible to come to rest on one tidy conclusion about CMI or
even through it. In essence, CMI performs false witness not only so
we can hear the voices of the voiceless, but also so we can consider how
such voicelessness is produced in the first place and the speech acts and
actors that do so. In the silent and shameful reflection that follows,
it becomes clear that CMI performs false witness so that we can hear
ourselves and recognise, albeit briefly, our ongoing false witnessing.
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Notes
1
2

3

4

5
6

For a summary of these claims and the discourse on witnessing within
theatre and performance studies more generally see Caroline Wake (2009).
This is a necessarily brief account of these events. For a more detailed
account, see David Marr and Marian Wilkinson (2003) and Patrick Weller
(2002).

This claim recalls Jonathan Kalb’s statement that, ‘Ours is an era obsessed
with witnessing, and an effective Verfremdung is nothing less than a reason
to consider one sort of witnessing more persuasive than another’ (2001:
28). Similarly, Julie Salverson calls for testimonial theatres to reject ‘the
lie of the literal’ (1996) and Timothy Raphael appeals for them to ‘break
the naturalist habit’ (1999).
In fact, the DVD itself is a problematic ‘witness’ because it is does not
actually show a single performance but rather two separate performances
cut together. I discovered this when I noticed that the DVD did not include
a date for the performance it had recorded. When I asked Williams to
confirm the date he explained what had happened.
This passage does not appear in the published script; what appears here
has been transcribed from the DVD of the performance.
Reviewers who made the same mistake include Andrew Filmer (2004),
John McCallum (2004), Colin Rose (2004), Bryoni Trezise (2004) and
Joe Woodward (2004).
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